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INTRODUCTION
On January 4, 2020, the streets of Tehran spilled over with individuals
donned in black. 1 A three-day national period of mourning commenced in
Iran—the sea of drawn faces only broken up by raised pictures of General
Qassem Soleimani. 2 On the previous night in a highly classified mission,
a United States MQ-9 Reaper Drone fired into a convoy leaving Baghdad
International Airport. 3 Several individuals were killed, and among them
was Iran’s top security and intelligence commander General Qassem
Soleimani, who the United States government suspected of engaging in
past and future terrorist attacks on the United States. 4
Prior to the strike, President Donald J. Trump was on vacation at his
resort in Palm Beach, Florida. 5 There, he insisted that he did not want war
with Iran. 6 He told reporters, “I don’t think that would be a good idea for
1. Iran in mourning, vows revenge for Qassem Soleimani’s killing, AL
JAZEERA (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/3/iran-inmourning-vows-revenge-for-qassem-soleimanis-killing [https://perma.cc/X6R2URYV].
2. Id.
3. Michael Crowley et al., U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani,
Commander of Iranian Forces, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html
[https://perma.cc/34J6-YEUR].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Iran. It wouldn’t last very long, . . . I want to have peace. I like peace.”7
Three days later, President Trump authorized the targeted strike on
Soleimani without consulting Congress—a strike that has since been
considered a “reckless unilateral escalation.” 8
While few details were given regarding the imminent threat posed by
Soleimani that triggered the airstrike, the U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel wrote a memorandum to the Legal Advisor of the
National Security Council explaining the incident.9 While most of the
memorandum was redacted, Assistant Attorney General Stephen Engel
admitted the airstrike was a targeted operation to kill Soleimani. 10 The
Office of Legal counsel justified the strike using the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF),
which authorizes the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United
States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to . . .
defend the national security of the United States against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq . . . .” 11 Killing Soleimani was legally justifiable
because of the historically broad interpretation of the 2002 AUMF. 12
While controversy regarding the legality of this incident remains unsolved,
the killing of Soleimani has drawn the attention of scholars, causing them
to question just how far the President’s power and discretion extends under
an authorization of force. 13
History continues to remind us that few meaningful limitations on a
President’s use of armed force exist. 14 The few restraints in place are all
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Memorandum from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, to
John A. Eisenberg, Legal Advisor to the National Security Council (Mar. 10,
2020) (on file with The United States Department of Justice), https://www
.justice.gov/olc/opinions-main [https://perma.cc/D2WA-HA2N].
10. Id.
11. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
12. Memorandum from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, to John
A. Eisenberg, Legal Advisor to the National Security Council, supra note 9.
13. Scott R. Anderson, Did the President Have the Domestic Legal Authority
to Kill Qassem Soleimani?, LAWFARE (Jan. 3, 2020, 4:49 PM), https://www.law
fareblog.com/did-president-have-domestic-legal-authority-kill-qassem-soleimani
[https://perma.cc/C9WS-DFR9].
14. Despite the power to “declare war” being an independent power of
Congress, the executive proves to have other various powers, such as the
commander-in-chief power, allowing the executive to use force subject to Article
II. See U.S. CONST. art. II. Further, some powers rooted within commander-inchief power may be considered exclusive to the president. This is particularly
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but washed away in circumstances where Congress has affirmatively
authorized the President to use force.15 Though Congress has the sole
authority under Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to declare war,
the issuance of an AUMF allows the President to use whatever military
force he 16 considers to be consistent with the congressional
authorization. 17 Given the urgency of the circumstances surrounding
authorizations, Congress generally drafts AUMFs broadly. Broad drafting
of an AUMF, like that of the 2002 AUMF, leaves the scope of its reach
unclear. 18 This may result in the President interpreting an authorization in
a manner justifying a variety of seemingly unrelated subsequent acts. The
search for meaningful restraints on AUMFs has proven difficult because
judges and scholars have been met with judicial and legislative
impediments. 19
Sometimes, however, Presidents limit the executive branch through
the issuance of an executive order. 20 Presidents most often use executive
orders to regulate the internal affairs of the executive branch. 21 While
within the “theater of war.” See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
15. AUMFs grant sweeping power to the executive, which would normally
be vested with the Congress. Generally, the broad language results in discretion
within one person as opposed to a body which proves difficult to limit. See
generally Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, The Efficacy, Limitations, and Continued
Need for Authorizations for Use of Military Force, 21 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 6
(2019).
16. The pronoun “he” is used here and throughout this Comment when
referring to the President. After careful consideration, I have made the stylistic
decision to use “he” for ease of reference. While it is true that the role of President
of the United States has historically been filled by men, I am hopeful to see a day
when my Comment’s use of “he” will prove to be outdated.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Note that congressional authorizations empower
the President but also require him to follow limitations in the authorization at least
insofar as the congressional authorization justifies presidential use of force. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
18. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31133,
DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY
FORCE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 14 (2014),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL31133/17
[https://perma.cc/MR6M-9AQC].
19. See discussion infra Part II.
20. See generally Erica Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J.
2026 (2015).
21. What Is an Executive Order?, ABA (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-docs/what-is-an
-executive-order-/ [https://perma.cc/93VS-2FE6].
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executive orders differ from the statutory laws Congress passes, executive
orders still purport to govern the executive branch and are afforded the
“force and effect given to a statute enacted by Congress.” 22 If executive
orders are afforded the force and effect of law, AUMFs should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with executive orders. 23 In rare
instances in which the President issues an executive order that limits
executive power, congressional delegations of power to the President that
are broadly drafted should be interpreted with respect to the internal
limitations placed upon the executive branch. In these cases, the text of the
executive order and the AUMF should be harmonized, meaning that the
Office of Legal Counsel, when assisting the President in his determination
of what force can be used under the authorization, should ensure that
AUMFs and executive orders are interpreted in a way that renders them
compatible and not contradictory prior to using military force. Reading
broadly drafted grants of power to the President in light of internal limits
of the executive branch will protect AUMFs from being appropriated to
uses for which they were never intended. Though this has not been
recognized as a meaningful limitation on AUMFs, the legal system would
be better served if executive orders were integrated into the current
understanding of restraints on the power the President may exercise under
AUMFs.
Part I of this Comment introduces the basics of AUMFs and the
difficulty that they pose with regards to the expansion of presidential
power. Part II of this Comment describes the difficulty that courts and
scholars have experienced in restraining presidential power under
AUMFs. This Part articulates the barriers to finding meaningful restraints
both from a judicial and legislative standpoint. Part III of this Comment
expounds upon executive orders and considers presidential powers as a
potential area where restraints can be drawn. Part IV proposes that courts
consider self-imposed limitations on the Executive as an avenue for
placing meaningful restraints on the President’s ability to use force under
a force authorization. Part V considers the potential issues that may arise
when viewing executive orders as limitations. Finally, Part VI illustrates
the solution of harmonization by applying the principle using Executive
Order 12,333 and Executive Order 13,732 to limit the scope of the broadly
drafted 2001 AUMF.

22. See Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc. 375 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1967).
23. See id.
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I. THE POWER DYNAMIC: EXECUTIVE POWER, LEGISLATIVE POWER, &
THE RESULTS OF THEIR INTERACTION
Although the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly reference a
separation of powers, it allocates exclusive powers to each of the three
branches of government. 24 Article I enumerates the powers given to the
legislative branch. 25 Article II vests certain powers with the executive
branch. 26 Finally, Article III lists the powers granted to the judicial
branch. 27 The Framers, in incorporating this Montesquieuian 28 theory of
separation of powers, intended to vest different powers within the three
branches to “safeguard against tyranny by combating excessive
concentration of power.” 29
A. Executive Power
Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests in the President the executive
power. 30 Under the Constitution, the President has the duty to faithfully
execute the laws. 31 While it may be difficult to draw a line between the
powers afforded to Congress and the President regarding foreign policy
issues, the President, as Head of State, has the sole authority to recognize
foreign governments, receive foreign ambassadors, and negotiate
treaties. 32 Additionally, he has powers as Commander in Chief, which
grant him authority over military operations. 33 Courts and scholars alike
24. NOAH R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
297 (20th ed. Foundation Press 2019); see U.S. CONST arts. I–III.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
26. See id. art. II.
27. See id. art. III.
28. Montesquieu, an 18th century French philosopher, coined the term
“Separation of Powers.” Montesquieu’s model divides government into separate
branches, giving each branch separate and independent powers. This ensures that
one branch of government is not more powerful than the others. See Separation
of Powers, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/separation_of_powers_0#:~:text=The%20term%20%E2%80%9CSeparatio
n%20of%20Powers,has%20separate%20and%20independent%20powers [https:
//perma.cc/JRH4-RXUP] (last visited July 25, 2022).
29. See FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 297.
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
31. Id. art. II, § 3.
32. Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other
Presidential Directives, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 267, 277 (2001) (citing U.S. v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
33. Newland, supra note 20, at 2031.
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have interpreted these enumerated powers to afford the President a great
deal of authority over such issues. 34 Specifically, the President has been
deemed to be the sole organ of foreign affairs. 35 The Sole Organ Theory
of foreign affairs originated during the Neutrality Controversy of 1793,
where Alexander Hamilton, writing under the name Pacificus, introduced
the idea that the United States Constitution implicitly makes the Executive
the sole organ of communication with foreign nations. 36 This idea was
based on the enumerated powers affording the President the authority to
negotiate treaties and appoint and receive ambassadors. 37 The judiciary
recognizes the idea that the President acts as the sole organ of foreign
affairs, as it has been referenced explicitly38 and implicitly 39 in cases
pertaining to foreign affairs. 40 For this reason, the execution of foreign
policy and diplomatic relations is generally left to the President. 41
Although the President is not tasked with making laws, he is not
completely excluded from acting in a capacity that, on its face, appears
legislative in nature, as he is able to issue executive orders.42 The President
issues executive orders to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.43
An executive order is a rule or order serving as a directive from the
President of the United States. 44 The orders are used to manage the affairs
and operations of the executive branch and its agencies. 45 Executive orders
are generally limited to the governing of executive agencies, and while
they may cover a wide variety of different topics, they do not require
congressional approval. 46 Because executive orders are not considered
legislation, they are not subject to the traditional, law-making process;
therefore, they are exempt from congressional approval. 47
34. Gaziano, supra note 32, at 277.
35. See generally ALEXANDER HAMILTON, “PACIFICUS” NO. 1 (1793),
reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33 (Harold C. Syrett &
Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1969); see also Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 320.
36. HAMILTON, supra note 35, at 33.
37. Id.
38. See generally Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304.
39. See generally Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
40. See generally Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304; Crosby, 530 U.S.
363.
41. Gaziano, supra note 32, at 277.
42. What Is an Executive Order?, supra note 21.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Newland, supra note 20, at 2031. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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While the sitting United States President has the sole authority to issue
and overturn executive orders, the U.S. Constitution does not expressly
vest in the President the authority to issue such orders. 48 Despite the lack
of an explicit grant of authority within the Constitution, the power to issue
executive orders can be implied or inherent to the substantive powers that
the Constitution or a federal statute has afforded to the President. 49 The
powers most frequently used to justify presidential authority to issue
executive orders are the President’s powers as Commander in Chief, Head
of State, Chief Law Enforcement Officer, and Head of the Executive
Branch. 50 Although there is no express power given to the President to
issue executive orders, so long as the president is acting within one of the
powers previously mentioned, he is afforded broad discretion in the
directives he issues. 51
Presidents are often inclined to use executive orders because they are
not directly subject to the hurdles of the legislative process and, therefore,
not burdened by the procedural restraints associated with the legislative
branch. 52 As the Supreme Court recognized in Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the lack of legislative constraints on
executive orders makes them an effective tool for a sitting President
because executive orders are able to bypass congressional scrutiny. 53
Although capable of circumventing the constraints of the legislative
process, these presidential directives still affect the lives of millions of
Americans because they impact the structure of the federal government. 54
This has elicited controversy, as executive orders are capable of
implicating individual rights and governmental structure while bypassing
the procedural restraints imposed on other forms of lawmaking. 55
Ultimately, the question becomes: “Who will watch the warders?” 56

48. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
49. Gaziano, supra note 32, at 276.
50. Id.
51. Newland, supra note 20, at 2031.
52. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); see John E. Noyes, Executive
Orders, Presidential Intent, and Private Rights of Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 837,
839 n.10 (1981) (“Executive orders are effective Presidential tools because they
do not need the approval of Congress, therefore largely bypassing congressional
and public scrutiny . . . .”).
53. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
54. Newland, supra note 20, at 2032–33.
55. See id.
56. JUVENAL, SATIRE VI, at lines 347–48 (trans. G. G. Ramsay, 2008) (1918).
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Despite the controversy surrounding executive orders, courts have
deemed these instruments to have the “force and effect of law.” 57 While
the ability to create executive orders pertaining to foreign relations is not
expressly granted, and executive orders are not subject to congressional
approval, the powers the President possesses concerning foreign affairs
offer some substantive authority that the Constitution vests in the President
the power to issue executive orders. 58 The issuance of foreign affairsrelated executive orders would then have the effect of being a tool utilized
by the President for the faithful execution of the laws. 59
B. Congressional Power
In contrast to the powers granted to the executive branch, Article I
delegates “[a]ll legislative Powers” to Congress. 60 Article I sets forth the
legislative process by which Congress makes law. 61 Specifically, Article
I, section 1 vests all legislative powers in Congress and creates two houses
within Congress—the Senate and the House of Representatives. 62 The
presence of two houses within a legislative body is known as
bicameralism. 63 The power to make laws is shared between the two
houses, and one cannot make law without the other. 64 This is because the
branches are co-dependent upon one another in that the House of
Representatives and the Senate must each pass a bill for that bill to become
law. 65 While the bills originate in either the House of Representatives or
the Senate, the non-originating house may propose amendments or concur
with amendments. 66 Once both houses pass the bill, Congress must present
the bill to the President of the United States pursuant to the Presentment
Clause located in Article I, section 7. 67 The President may then either sign
the bill into law or return the bill to the originating house for
57. Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc. 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967).
58. Gaziano, supra note 32, at 276.
59. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
60. Id. art. I, § 1.
61. Id. art. I, § 7.
62. Id. art. 1, §1.
63. Definition of bicameral, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/bicameralism [https://perma.cc/922H-EHPZ] (last visited
July 26, 2022).
64. How a Bill Becomes a Law, AM. GOV’T, www.ushistory.org/gov/6e.asp
[https://perma.cc/HNB9-74AK] (last visited July 2, 2022).
65. See id.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
67. Id.
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reconsideration. 68 In the event the President returns an unsigned bill to the
originating house, Congress must reconsider and pass the bill again by a
two-thirds majority of each house for the bill to become a law. 69 This
process is known as bicameralism and presentment. 70 Since the Founders
considered efficiency to be one of the hallmarks of oppressive
government, they crafted the tedious process of bicameralism and
presentment. 71 The hurdles ensured that the laws passed were the product
of careful consideration and that no laws were created on a mere whim.72
While the bicameralism and presentment process ensures that all laws
passed are carefully considered and deliberate, the process takes time. The
untimeliness of the bicameralism and presentment process often renders
the legislative process ill-suited for matters requiring swift and efficient
decision-making. 73
In addition to Congress’s general task of law-making, Article 1,
section 8 of the U.S. Constitution vests in Congress the sole authority to
declare war. 74 Despite the ability to declare war being widely associated
with the authority to use military force, Congress has been increasingly
reluctant to use its power to declare war. 75 Though the formal declaration
of war seems to be a relic of Congress’s past, it would be incorrect to
assume that this is due to a decrease in U.S. engagement in foreign
hostilities. 76 In fact, the U.S.’s armed hostilities have continued through
the legislature’s gradual secession of power to the executive branch. 77
While the structure of the Constitution reflects the notion of a
separation of powers, this separation was never intended to be airtight. 78
Often the powers afforded to the branches are intermixed, raising
questions as to which branch has the authority to assert particular
powers. 79 Ultimately, the intermixing of executive and legislative powers
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Boris Bershteyn, An Article I, Section 7 Perspective on Administrative
Law Remedies, 114 YALE L.J. 359, 361 (2004).
71. How a Bill Becomes a Law, supra note 64.
72. Id.
73. This is consistent with the Founders’ belief that efficiency was a hallmark
of oppressive government. See id.
74. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
75. Scott M. Sullivan, Interpreting Force Authorization, 43 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 241, 245 (2015) (citing Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the
Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 320 (2002)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 297.
79. See id.
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has led to the strengthening of the President’s discretionary authority with
respect to foreign affairs and the use of force. 80 In particular, this
intermixing of powers occurs when Congress, acting in its legislative
capacity, cedes a portion of its legislative power to the President through
the passage of a statute. 81 When this occurs, the President and Congress
are able to act with one accord, as the President is presumptively afforded
congressional approval for future acts. 82
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States saw an
appreciation for the centralization of powers including centralization
through legislative grants of power to the President. 83 This is a result of
the advantage of having an Executive who is able to act swiftly, providing
the United States with a unified voice in times of national emergency. 84
C. Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMFs)
Congressional statutes that authorize the President to use military
force are one of the clearest examples of the secession of military power
from the legislative branch to the executive branch. 85 These statutes, often
referred to as authorizations for the use of military force (AUMFs), date
back to President John Adams’s administration. 86 At Adams’s request,
Congress authorized the Adams administration to use force to protect U.S.
commercial vessels against France in 1798 and further authorized the
Jefferson administration to do the same against Tripoli in 1802. 87 Many
past presidential administrations used these authorizations. 88 This
includes, but is not limited to, the James Madison, Dwight Eisenhower,
Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush administrations. 89
While AUMFs allow the President to use military force, they differ
from and are not considered equivalent to formal declarations of war
because they do not trigger common wartime statutes and procedures that

80. Sullivan, supra note 75, at 244–45.
81. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. S.D. ex rel. Payne, 250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919).
82. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
83. Sullivan, supra note 75, at 245 n.9.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 244.
86. GRIMMETT ET AL., supra note 18, at 5.
87. Id. at 5–6.
88. Id. at 6–18.
89. Id.
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allow the President additional discretion in various domestic areas. 90
Despite this, AUMFs have often “delegated sweeping powers to the
president through” their broad drafting. 91 AUMFs function by granting the
President authority to conduct uses of force typically reserved for times of
war without a congressional declaration of war. 92 Broad drafting is a
characteristic of AUMFs that makes them effective during times of
national emergency. This is due to Congress’s ability to draft and
implement them quickly. 93
Notable examples of this are the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for the
Use of Military Force. 94 On September 18, 2001, one week after the fall
of the World Trade Center, Congress passed Joint Resolution 107-40,
authorizing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 . . . .” 95 The goal of this joint resolution, now
commonly referred to as the 2001 AUMF, was to “prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States . . . .” 96 The instrument
authorized the use of force not only on foreign states but also on
organizations or any individuals that could be linked to the September 11,
2001 attacks. 97 Overall, the 2001 AUMF grants vast discretion to the
President when authorizing force. 98 Namely, it allows the President to
interpret Congressional intent regarding the method of force that is
“necessary and appropriate” to deter terrorism against the United States. 99
For this reason, the 2001 AUMF is famously referenced as a “blank

90. A declaration of war invokes the statutes that give the President discretion
in areas pertaining to the following: nationals of enemy states within U.S.
territory, trade with opposing forces, surveillance for gathering foreign
intelligence information, appointment of commanders, and use of natural
resources on public lands and the continental shelf. See id.
91. Qureshi, supra note 15, at 6.
92. GRIMMETT ET AL., supra note 18, at 6–18.
93. Id.
94. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. §
2, 115 Stat. 225 (2001) (enacted); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong., 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
95. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2,
115 Stat. 225 (2001) (enacted).
96. Id.
97. GRIMMETT ET AL., supra note 18, at 17.
98. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2,
115 Stat. 225 (2001) (enacted).
99. Id.
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check” 100 to the President for the use of force. 101 The broad drafting of the
2001 AUMF has even resulted in it being viewed as “‘full congressional
authorization for the President to prosecute a war’” despite congressional
power to declare war under the U.S. Constitution. 102 Like the 2001 AUMF,
the 2002 AUMF shares similar broadly drafted language. 103
D. AUMFs: The Consequences of Broad Drafting
Such broad construction of AUMFs gives the President the sole
authority to interpret and execute AUMFs in any way that he deems fit, as
the language often permits discretion with respect to the circumstances
where force can be used and the scope of that force. 104 It is true that there
is an element of functionality that is desirable where the President is given
the authority to make decisions regarding the use of force. 105 While there
is value in the functionality of giving the President authority to use force
100. Congressional member Rep. Barbara Lee (D-Cal.) first used the term
“blank check” in defending her vote against the passage of the 2001 AUMF.
Specifically, Lee referred to the 2001 AUMF as “a blank check to the president
to attack anyone involved in Sept. 11 events -- anywhere, in any country . . .
without time limit.” Since Lee termed the 2001 AUMF a “blank check,” scholars
have widely referred to it as such. See Barbara Lee, Why I opposed the resolution
to authorize force, SFGATE (Sept. 23, 2001), https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/
article/Why-I-opposed-the-resolution-to-authorize-force-2876893.php [https://
perma.cc/J9XQ-VFW3]; see also Heather Brandon-Smith, The 2001 AUMF and
Afghanistan, 18 Years Later, FRIENDS COMM. ON NAT’L LEGIS. (Sept. 18, 2019),
https://www.fcnl.org/updates/2019-09/2001-aumf-and-afghanistan-18-years-later
[https://perma.cc/ASR5-7KTK].
101. Lee, supra note 100; Brandon-Smith, supra note 100.
102. Qureshi, supra note 15, at 16 (quoting Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2047, 2083 (2005)).
103. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
104. For example, language in the 2002 AUMF gives the President the power
to authorize force whenever he deems it “necessary and appropriate.”
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
105. The President is often considered better suited for making decisions
regarding foreign affairs. Namely, the President has confidential sources of
information and “agents in the form of diplomatic, consular[,] and other officials.”
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). Further, secrecy of
this information and avoidance of premature disclosure is often of utmost
importance. Overall, the President, not Congress, has better opportunities of
knowing conditions that prevail in foreign countries. See id.
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in times of necessity, affording too much discretion can cause an AUMF
to begin to look like a “blank check” 106 to declare war—a power that is
vested with the legislative branch. 107 In vesting the power to declare war
with Congress and not the President, the Framers addressed a common
critique of the British Monarchy: they wanted to ensure that common folk
would not have to go to war and die at the hand of one leader engrossed in
the heat of private passion. 108 AUMFs, while not formal declarations of
war, often involve common folk risking their lives at the hand of one
man. 109 Scholars and judges ought to be wary of the implications of
straying from the Framer’s intent of vesting power to declare war with the
branch of government subject to the democratic process. This is
particularly true when it stifles the people’s voice in decisions affecting
the United States as a whole.
In addition to the dangers of affording the President too much
discretion in authorizing force, there is further concern with the continued
broadening of AUMFs through presidential interpretation. If presidents
continue to interpret AUMFs broadly, precedent may be set for later
administrations to do the same, further blurring the line between uses of
force reserved for Congress and those afforded to the President. The
Trump administration’s justification for the killing of Soleimani illustrates
one way a president may broadly interpret AUMFs. 110
Following the use of force, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel released a memorandum justifying the Trump
administration’s acts. 111 The Office of Legal Counsel used the 2002
AUMF to justify the strike against Soleimani.112 Following Assistant
106. See Lee, supra note 100.
107. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
108. In The Federalist No. 6, Hamilton stated that some wars:
[T]ake their origin intirely in private passions; in the attachments,
enmities, interests, hopes and fears of leading individuals in the
communities of which they are members. Men of this class, whether the
favourites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances abused
the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public
motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquility to personal
advantage, or personal gratification.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
109. Since AUMFs grant the President discretion to use force, this lends itself
to the President unilaterally exposing citizens to foreign hostilities.
110. Memorandum from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, to John
A. Eisenberg, Legal Advisor to the National Security Council, supra note 9.
111. See id.
112. See id.
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Attorney General Steven Engels’s recognition of the historically broad
interpretation of the 2002 AUMF, he explained:
Although the primary focus of the 2002 AUMF was the threat
posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime, the statute has long been
read, in accordance with its express goals, to authorize the use of
force for the related purposes of helping to establish a stable,
democratic Iraq and addressing terrorist threats emanating from
Iraq. . . . Such use of force need not address threats emanating
from only the Iraqi government, but may address threats also
posed by militias . . . . 113
Here, the Office of Legal Counsel for the Trump Administration
interpreted the 2002 AUMF in a way that underscored its primary
purpose—addressing the threat posed by or emanating from Iraq. 114 The
presidential discretion that the 2002 AUMF’s broad drafting created
resulted in the appropriation of the statute for a use that is, at best,
attenuated from the original purpose of the 2002 AUMF. 115 Due to judicial
impediments and congressional restraints on power, there are few ways in
which this sort of interpretation can be reviewed or limited in future
instances. As AUMFs divert from the context of their original drafting, the
need for limitations on their grant of power increases. Given the fact that
presidential administrations continue to enact foreign policy, questions
concerning the limitations of executive discretion under AUMFs will
likely continue to arise. 116 Further, it forces one to ask whether there are
any meaningful restraints on the Executive’s power following the passage
of these AUMFs.
II. BARRIERS TO FINDING MEANINGFUL RESTRAINTS ON BROADLY
DRAFTED AUMFS
In the search for meaningful restraints on the power of the President
under AUMFs, courts may only address the restraints if an injured party
challenges the exercise of power. 117 If the President’s exercise of power is
challenged, courts face the task of seeking meaningful restraints to restore
113. Id. at 20.
114. Id. at 2.
115. The original purpose of the 2002 AUMF was to address the threat
emanating from Iraq. See id.
116. See generally GRIMMETT ET AL., supra note 18.
117. For the judiciary to limit the power of the President, there must first be a
case or controversy for which the Court has jurisdiction. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 198–99 (1962); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

464

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

the balance of power without further complicating it through judicial
overstep. 118 The answer to the question of meaningful restraints on power
has proven difficult to answer due to the various judicial and legislative
impediments, which are discussed below, that tend to favor executive
discretion. Favoring executive discretion makes it difficult to find any
meaningful limitations on the power of the President, resulting in a
strengthening of the Executive over time. These legislative and judicial
impediments include non-justiciability doctrines, deference doctrines, and
restraints on the power of Congress. 119
A. Judicial Impediments
For a court to hear a case on the merits, the case must be justiciable. 120
A court may find a challenge nonjusticiable when a party lacks standing
or when an issue presents a political question. 121 Additionally, even if a
court determines a case may be heard on the merits, courts have a
customary policy of deferring to the executive. 122
1. Standing
Parties before a court must have standing to sue. 123 There are three
elements of standing: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered or be likely to
suffer a concrete injury in fact; (2) the injury must be fairly traceable to
the defendant’s conduct; and (3) the injury must be likely to be remedied
by a favorable judgement. 124 Since most foreign affairs activities do not
have a direct effect on private citizens, foreign affairs issues often can only
be heard on the merits where there is legislative standing. 125
The legislative standing doctrine is “a special body of case law . . . that
addresses the question of standing when the party is a legislator or
legislative body seeking relief based on an injury in an official
118. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (attempting to define limitations on the power of President).
119. See discussion infra Parts II.A & B.
120. See Justiciability LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL L. SCH., https://www
.law.cornell.edu/wex/justiciability [https://perma.cc/WW3K-Z78W] (last visited
July 25, 2022).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005).
123. See FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 34; see also U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
124. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
125. See generally Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997); Campbell v. Clinton,
203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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capacity.” 126 Even when a member of Congress brings the challenge,
standing is often difficult to achieve in foreign affairs cases.127 The
Supreme Court’s opinions in Raines v. Byrd 128 and Campbell v. Clinton 129
sharply limit the circumstances where members of Congress can challenge
the validity of legislation or actions by the executive branch in court. In
Raines, the Court found that there was no standing for members of
Congress to challenge the Line Item Veto Act. 130 Though the members of
Congress were able to assert an institutionalized grievance, the
institutional injury was insufficient to confer standing. 131 This ruling
asserted that the harm was to the congressional office itself, and, therefore,
the individual congressmen did not have a personal claim to that harm. 132
Essentially, the Court determined that for legislators to have standing, they
must allege a harm personal to themselves rather than the office they
hold. 133
The Court later applied this principle in Campbell. 134 In Campbell,
thirty-one members of Congress challenged President Bill Clinton’s
bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. 135 The members of Congress
claimed the campaign violated the Constitution because the bombing
required congressional authorization prior to taking action since it was not
a defensive use of force. 136 In Campbell, the Supreme Court found that the
members of Congress had no standing because the President did not claim
to be acting on congressional authorization but instead on his own Article
II powers as Commander in Chief. 137 Since President Clinton justified his
use of force under his Article II powers, the members of Congress could
not articulate a personal harm. 138 President Clinton’s bombing campaign
was not in violation of congressional authorization; therefore, it did not
result in a nullification of Congress’s vote against the campaign. 139
126. Kevin M. Lewis, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10317, THE SUPREME
COURT’S LATEST WORD ON “LEGISLATIVE STANDING” AND LAWSUITS BY
CONGRESSIONAL PLAINTIFFS 1 (2019).
127. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 27.
128. Raines, 521 U.S. 811.
129. Campbell, 302 F.3d 19.
130. Raines, 521 U.S. at 813.
131. Id. at 821.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 829.
134. See generally Campbell, 302 F.3d 19.
135. Id. at 19.
136. Id. at 20.
137. Id. at 23.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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Ultimately, these two cases narrow legislative standing, especially in
instances invoking separation of powers concerns. 140 The Court’s
narrowly tailored standing principles are reflective of the important role
that standing plays in the separation of powers. In 1983, then-Judge Scalia
articulated this role of standing as a doctrine which “roughly restricts
courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals . . .
[while excluding courts] from the even more undemocratic role of
prescribing how the other two branches should function . . . .” 141 Scalia’s
quote reflects the idea that standing serves to ensure appropriate powers
remain within their designated branches. While this is consistent with
general notions of separation of powers, it may result in the Executive
being more likely to engage in unlawful activities due to a lack of oversight
from any coordinate branch. Despite whether the Court has articulated the
proper standard for conferring standing in cases involving foreign affairs,
what remains undisputed is that in cases invoking separation of powers,
the parties will often fail to have standing. Therefore, the issue may never
be heard on the merits. 142
2. Political Question
Even where a party has standing, a court may be reluctant to hear the
case on its merits due to the issue’s political nature. 143 Today, the modern
political question doctrine stands for the principle that some issues are
“committed to the unreviewable discretion of the political branches, and . . .
that some otherwise legal questions ought to be left to the other branches as a
matter of prudence.” 144 Although Baker v. Carr is the landmark decision
pertaining to political question doctrine, 145 the idea that political questions
should be decided outside the court originated in Marbury v. Madison. 146 In
Marbury, Justice Marshall explained: “Questions, in their nature political, or
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive can

140. See generally Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997); Campbell, 203 F.3d 19.
141. FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 55 (alteration in original)
(quoting Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983)).
142. Many foreign affairs activities do not affect private citizens. Even when
such activities do affect the lives of private individuals, they are often difficult to
prove. See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 566 U.S. 1009 (2012).
143. See FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 59.
144. Id.
145. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
146. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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never be made in this court.” 147 The Supreme Court rejected the idea that
it ought to intervene in presidential decisions where the President has been
afforded “constitutional or legal discretion . . . .” 148 While not all cases
related to foreign affairs are political question cases, Baker established that
cases touching foreign affairs are often political in nature because they
turn on questions that “involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably
committed to the executive or the legislature . . . .” 149 As such, those
questions “uniquely demand single-voiced statement[s] of the
Government’s views.” 150 Therefore, these decisions are to be left to either
the President or Congress. 151
While a court’s determination that a matter of foreign affairs is a
political question does not grant a decision on the merits of the case, it
yields a form of deference to the President. 152 Abstention from hearing a
case based on the its political nature suggests that the President alone has
the power to answer the question presented. 153 In effect, this results in
accepting the President’s determination of an issue as legally binding. 154
Therefore, in many circumstances, the courts, without hearing a case on
its merits, afford deference to the executive.
3. Judicial Deference
If a court agrees to hear a case invoking foreign policy concerns on
the merits, courts often afford deference to the views of the executive
branch. 155 Generally speaking, courts have a “customary policy of
147. Id. at 170.
148. Id. at 166.
149. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. One example of this can be seen in the Court’s resolution in Goldwater
v. Carter. While Goldwater had unilaterally abrogated the treaty in question, the
Court failed to weigh in on the merits of whether a President could take such an
action unilaterally. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). A number of
justices in the plurality considered this a political question. Id. at 996–98. In effect,
by failing to consider and articulate the role Congress was to play in treaty
abrogation, the President’s unilateral abrogation of the treaty at issue went
unchallenged. The abstention and allowance of unilateral abrogation of the treaty,
as a practical matter, can be viewed as affording deference to the President to act
in this way.
153. See, e.g., id.
154. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L.
REV. 649, 660 (2000).
155. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005).
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deference to the President in matters of foreign affairs.” 156 In attempting
to explain the rationale behind affording deference to the Executive, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. reasoned
that the Executive requires flexibility in dealing with matters of foreign
affairs and national security. 157 The idea is that affording this deference
allows the President to respond to the ever-changing world conditions that
often prove complex in nature. 158 Additionally, the Court saw questions of
foreign affairs to be more political than legal, justifying the need to grant
deference to the President. 159 In the case of AUMFs, this is particularly
troublesome, as the President may often have an incentive to interpret
force authorizations broadly to accomplish agendas with which Congress
is likely to disagree. Practically, where the executive branch receives this
sort of deference, the President prevails in court with a “great
frequency.” 160 This deference is exemplified in the overwhelming rate of
success that presidents have had before the Court. 161 President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt prevailed in roughly 67% of cases, President Ronald
Reagan in nearly 80%, and President George W. Bush in 70%. 162 So long
as the Executive can show that its interpretation is reasonable, courts are
likely to defer to that interpretation.163
This judicial deference to the Executive is exemplified through the
Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii, where the Court considered
the constitutionality of a presidential exercise of power in accordance with
a congressional delegation. 164 On January 27, 2017, President Donald J.
Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,769, Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States. 165 The order barred visitors
from Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen for a period of
90 days. 166 Additionally, the executive order suspended the entry of Syrian
refugees indefinitely and blocked refugees from all other countries for a
period of 120 days. 167 This executive order was controversial because it
156. Id.
157. See U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Supreme Court Deference
to the President, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 832 (2018).
161. See id. at 832–33.
162. Id.
163. See Bradley, supra note 154, at 663.
164. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
165. Id. at 2436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2403.
167. FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 324.
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was allegedly motivated by anti-Muslim bias. 168 Following the stay of this
executive order, President Trump revoked the order and signed an
amended version. 169 President Trump then instated Executive Order No.
13,780. 170 The amended order removed Iraq from the list, created case-bycase waivers, and explained that the selection of the countries barred from
entry was based on the fact that they were “state sponsor[s] of terrorism,
ha[d] been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or
contain[ed] active conflict zones.” 171 Upon expiration of this order,
President Trump issued Proclamation No. 9645, which placed entry
restrictions on Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and
Yemen. 172 In issuing this proclamation, President Trump relied on 8
U.S.C. § 1182(f), a statutory provision of the Immigration and Nationality
Act which authorized the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or
any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry
of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate” whenever he
“finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United
States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States . . . .” 173
In response to these restrictions, three individuals with foreign relatives
affected by the suspension, along with the Muslim Association of Hawaii,
brought a claim arguing that the Proclamation violated several
immigration statues and the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 174
One of the arguments the plaintiffs asserted was that the proclamation
was not a valid exercise of presidential power. 175 In addressing this
argument, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, explained
that the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) “exudes deference to the President in
every clause.” 176 The only pre-requisite under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) was that
the President find that the entry of the aliens “would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States.” 177 According to Chief Justice Roberts,
President Trump had made such a finding and, therefore, fulfilled the sole
pre-requisite of issuing Proclamation No. 9645. 178 While the plaintiffs
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2417.
Id. at 2403–04.
Id. at 2404.
Id.
Id. at 2404–05.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2400.
Id. at 2408; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2400 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018)).
See id.
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asserted that President Trump must not only make a finding but also
explain that finding in detail for the purpose of judicial review, Chief
Justice Roberts concluded that this premise was questionable. 179 Though
the Court considered the explanation for President Trump’s finding to be
sufficient, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to reject the need for the President
to explain his actions at all. 180 Here, the Court afforded deference to the
President’s finding, irrespective of the reasons for such a decision. 181
Additionally, the Court refused to inquire into the persuasiveness of the
President’s justifications for issuing Proclamation No. 9645. 182 Here, the
Court cited Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, explaining that, “‘[w]hether
the President’s chosen method’ of addressing perceived risks is justified
from a policy perspective is ‘irrelevant to the scope of his [§1182(f)]
authority.’” 183 Further, Chief Justice Roberts explained that “when the
President adopts ‘a preventive measure . . . in the context of international
affairs and national security,’ he is ‘not required to conclusively link all of
the pieces in the puzzle before [courts] grant weight to [his] empirical
conclusions.’” 184 Overall, the Supreme Court seemed to afford nearabsolute deference to the Executive’s decision when the Executive makes
his decision pursuant to a congressional statute that permits him to make
a discretionary finding in matters implicating national security. 185
In Trump v. Hawaii, not only did the Court suggest that the
President’s finding alone was sufficient by questioning the need for an
explanation for judicial review, but it also deferred to the President’s
methodology in making such a finding. 186 Ultimately, the Court seems to
suggest, relying on prior opinions, that in cases of national security and
international affairs, it affords judicial deference to presidential
determinations. 187 While this Comment does not purport to address the
correctness of the Court’s decision, Trump v. Hawaii illustrates the sheer
magnitude of deference courts afford to the President when Congress
broadly drafts an authorization. In Trump v. Hawaii, the President was
acting pursuant to a congressional authorization of power, which conferred
179. Id. at 2409.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187–88 (1993)).
184. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project,
561 U.S. 1, 35 (2010)).
185. See, e.g., Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392.
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., id.; see also Sale, 509 U.S. 155; Holder, 561 U.S. 1.
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discretion upon the Executive. 188 A president’s use of military force under
an AUMF is similarly situated since it too would be an act by the President
pursuant to a congressional authorization of power, which would also
confer discretion upon the executive. 189 For this reason, it is likely that
even if a party were to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
a president’s use of force under an AUMF, a court is likely to defer to the
findings of the executive where national security is implicated. Affording
this sort of deference is as if a thumb is being placed on the scale of
executive power. A near-absolute deference, as in Trump v. Hawaii, makes
it difficult for the executive to lose. 190
4. A Weak Judicial Attempt to Limit Presidential Authority
Even in instances where the Court seeks to limit presidential authority,
the result the Court reaches often does not create sufficient limitations. 191
Notably, the Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v.
Sawyer attempted to meaningfully limit the power of the President. 192 In
1951, during the Korean War, President Harry S. Truman issued an
executive order seizing the steel mills in the United States to support the
war effort. 193 The President argued that this action was necessary to avoid
a national disaster; therefore, he was acting within his constitutional
capacity as the Commander in Chief and the nation’s chief executive. 194
The mill owners argued that the President’s actions amounted to
lawmaking and, therefore, were legislative in function. 195 Thus, the Court
had to determine whether the President was acting within his constitutional
power when he ordered the seizure of the steel mills. 196 In deciding this
issue, the majority held that the President’s power to issue an order must
either come from the Constitution itself or from an act of Congress. 197
Even more notable is Justice Jackson’s concurrence, which has
become the most influential and most frequently cited opinion from

188.
189.
190.
191.
(1952).
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See generally Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392.
Sullivan, supra note 75, at 244.
See id.
See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
Id. at 579.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 582.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585.
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Youngstown. 198 In fact, “[the] Supreme Court over the years has come to
treat Jackson’s concurrence as though it were the opinion of the Court.” 199
In his concurrence, Justice Jackson created a framework for analyzing
problems arising from exercises of presidential powers.200 Within this
framework, he articulated three categories in which an exercise of
presidential power can fall. 201 The category of exercise will determine how
great or how little deference the court affords the President in asserting
that power. 202
The first category refers to the most common type of executive action,
which occurs when the President acts pursuant to congressional
authority. 203 Justice Jackson found that this is where a President’s power
is at its maximum. 204 The second category is when the President acts in
the context of congressional silence. 205 This is what Justice Jackson
considered the “zone of twilight” where the President and Congress have
concurrent authority. 206 Finally, the third category encompasses
presidential actions of which Congress has expressed disapproval. 207 This
is where the President’s power is at its “lowest ebb.” 208
Justice Jackson’s framework attempts to limit the scope of the
President’s power when acting alone. 209 Further, it emphasizes the value
of congressional and executive alignment. 210 In suggesting that the
President is afforded the greatest level of discretion when acting within his
own powers and those of Congress, Justice Jackson artfully presented the
power of presidential and congressional alignment. 211
Despite the Court’s attempt in Youngstown to classify the weight of
presidential powers, the Court has inconsistently applied the Youngstown
198. FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 307.
199. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE
BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 360
(2010)).
200. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 634–55
(Jackson, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 635–38.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 635.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 637.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 634.
210. See id.
211. Id.
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Framework. 212 While Justice Jackson’s concurrence is helpful to
understand whether presidential action is lawful or unlawful, it fails to
delineate a manageable standard for determining the scope of the
President’s authority when AUMFs are broadly drafted. Although
instructive in theory, the framework is insufficient for the purposes of
placing practical limitations on presidential power under AUMFs. Justice
Jackson’s framework is flexible and easily manipulated. While
Youngstown is instructive as to how presidential power should be
conceptualized, it does little to combat the deference doctrines that make
it difficult to limit authorizations of force once they are drafted.
B. Legislative Impediments
Along with the various judicial impediments limiting the power of the
President with respect to AUMFs, the legislative process also serves as a
barrier to limiting broad authorizations of force once they are drafted and
passed. Generally, Congress drafts AUMFs broadly because armed
conflicts often unfold in unpredictable ways, and many aspects of such
conflicts remain unknown at the time of passage. 213 Since congressional
power is limited to law-making, 214 it may prove difficult both politically
and procedurally to roll back AUMFs once they exist. Congress neither
has the power to interpret the laws it makes nor the power to execute the
laws. 215 These powers are left with the judicial and executive branches,
respectively. 216 For this reason, the only avenue for congressional
limitation on authorizations of force after they have been drafted and
passed is through amendment or repeal. 217 Given the constraints of
bicameralism and presentment, the process to repeal or amend takes a
212. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). The Court has
understood and applied Jackson’s Youngstown framework inconsistently.
Although Jackson’s Youngstown framework was proposed as consisting of three
categories, it was later applied in Dames & Moore v. Regan as a spectrum. In
Dames & Moore, the Court seemed to blur the distinctions between the categories
Jackson set forth, creating a more flexible standard for the Court to decide
separation of powers issues. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 634–
55; see also Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669.
213. GRIMMETT ET AL., supra note 18, at 23–24.
214. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
215. See id.
216. See id. art. II, § 3; id. art. III.
217. See generally id. art. I, § 7 (detailing the process of bicameralism and
presentment); see also The Legislative Process, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislativeprocess [https://perma.cc/6Z9W-LUTC] (last visited July 4, 2022).
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significant amount of time.218 Bicameralism and presentment, as
addressed previously, refers to the Article I, section 7 sequence, which sets
forth requirements for federal law-making. 219 This process requires the
consensus of a two-thirds majority of the House and the Senate, which can
become a complicated process. 220 Additionally, following the process of
presentment, the President must sign the bill for it to become law.221 If he
does not, he may send it back to the house in which it originated, beginning
the process of congressional review all over again. 222 This process alone
makes it difficult even for Congress to place limitations on AUMFs once
they are drafted because it requires the consensus of both a significant
majority of Congress and the President. 223
Even in instances where Congress has attempted to claw back military
power from the President, those attempts have often been in vain. One
example of a congressional attempt to limit the power of the President is
the War Powers Resolution. 224 The Nixon Administration enacted the War
Powers Resolution in 1973 as an attempt to restore congressional war
powers following the Tonkin Gulf Crisis. 225 The War Powers Resolution
requires that the President consult with Congress prior to using force in
“all possible instances,” but it does not completely prohibit the President
from acting unilaterally. 226 The President may still use force without
consulting Congress, but if the President does so, he is required to report
that use of U.S. military force to Congress within 48 hours.227 While
reporting uses of force to Congress may assist in presenting a unified front
between the legislative and executive branches, it still results in Congress
being excluded from the decisions to use force in the first place. The
President retains his ability to use force unilaterally; therefore, it may be
the case that Congress gets strong-armed into backing the President for
purposes of appearing unified on decisions of foreign policy.
Overall, there remains a need for finding meaningful limitations on
presidential ability to interpret AUMFs following their passage. The
existence of judicial and procedural restraints creates a common barrier to

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Bershteyn, supra note 70.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Id.
Id.
See id.
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1550.
GRIMMETT ET AL., supra note 18, at 25.
Id.
Id.
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judicial and legislative pursuits to find such limitations. 228 These restraints
have yielded the unexpected consequence of stifling the ability of the
branches to restore the balance when it is disrupted. Since procedural
restraints of both the judicial and the legislative processes prevent the
finding of meaningful limitations on executive power, the only remaining
alternative is to seek a solution where these procedural barriers do not
exist. If, as a result of the presence of judicial and legislative procedures,
the President is free to do as he pleases, then maybe that freedom ought to
be where the solution lies. Therefore, it may be the case that the solution
to creating meaningful limitations is in the last area not tied up by
procedural restraints—the power of the President himself.
III. EXECUTIVE ORDERS: LIMITING THE SCOPE OF AUMFS WITH SELFIMPOSED RESTRICTIONS
As previously noted, executive orders are subject to much debate
because they are not subject to the legislative processes of bicameralism
and presentment 229 even though they have the force and effect of law. 230
Despite controversy over the lack of procedural restraints associated with
executive orders, the lack of restraint actually renders an executive order
distinct from the processes that have failed to find meaningful restraints
on presidential power. The lack of procedural restraints associated with
executive orders acts as a useful advantage for meaningfully restraining
executive power with respect to AUMFs. This is especially true when an
executive order is of a limiting nature.
Although executive orders are not currently at “the top of the
judiciary’s interpretive toolbox,” they have not been excluded from
considerations completely. 231 For example, the D.C. Circuit Court in
Department of Air Force, Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan Air
Force Base, California v. Federal Labor Relations Authority explained
that when the court is unclear on the congressional intent of a statute, an
executive order can be relevant in determining the scope of that statute. 232
Though the D.C. Circuit Court limited the use of an executive order only
to times when congressional intent cannot otherwise be determined, 233 the
228. Namely, these procedural restraints include non-justiciability doctrines,
deference doctrines, and bicameralism and presentment as discussed above.
229. Newland, supra note 20, at 2032–33.
230. Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967).
231. Newland, supra note 20, at 2072.
232. Dep’t of Air Force, Sacramento Air Logistics Ctr., McClellan Air Force
Base, Cal. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 877 F.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
233. Id.
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court’s willingness to seek guidance from executive orders reflects the
desire of the judiciary to achieve and maintain unity amongst the branches.
While executive orders have not been regularly used for the purposes of
interpreting AUMFs, courts have alluded to the idea that they may be
instructive when Congress’ broad drafting yields ambiguity as to the scope
of the AUMF. 234
Amongst the difficulties of finding meaningful limitations on AUMFs
once Congress drafts them, judges and scholars should look to selfimposed restrictions on the executive branch to meaningfully limit the
power of the President. While Congress may afford discretion to the
President through broad authorizations of force, executive orders of a
limiting nature can be used to limit the discretion of the President. For this
reason, where a pre-existing, self-imposed limitation on executive power
exists, a broad AUMF should be interpreted in a manner consistent with
executive orders, thereby meaningfully restricting the President’s ability
to use force unilaterally. Specifically, when determining the limitations on
AUMFs, these authorizations should be interpreted with the intent to reach
harmonization between the AUMF and the executive order.
Harmonization suggests that the texts ought to be interpreted in a way that
renders them compatible and not contradictory. 235 Reading broadly drafted
grants of power to the Executive so as to make them compatible with the
executive branch’s self-imposed limitations will protect AUMFs from
being appropriated to uses of which they were never intended. Further, it
would serve the legal system by promoting unity amongst the branches of
government and helping to prevent frustration of separation of powers that
may result from AUMFs with unidentified limits.
Courts have accepted that executive orders are “equal in stature” to
congressional statutes. 236 While this may present a theoretical fiction
because executive orders are not subject to judicial restraint, the courts’
practical acceptance of executive orders has not been disputed.237 Their
acceptance in court serves as the basis for allowing a statutory canon of
interpretation, like harmonization, to be applied to executive orders. If
executive orders have the same force and effect 238 as those laws Congress
promulgates, it should not be controversial to consider them in light of one
234. See generally id.
235. Canons of Construction, UNIV. HOUS. L. CTR., https://www.law.uh.edu/
faculty/adjunct/dstevenson/2018Spring/CANONS%20OF%20CONSTRUCTION.
pdf [https://perma.cc/G6U9-CNWV] (last visited Oct. 29, 2022).
236. Newland, supra note 20, at 2065.
237. See Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Minn. v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
238. Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967).
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another. Regardless of the distinctions between legislative law-making
and executive law-making, courts have given executive orders the force
and effect of law 239 and have repeatedly treated executive orders as equal
to congressional statutes for the purposes of interpretation. 240 It is for these
reasons that attempting to harmonize executive orders and AUMFs is
appropriate.
A. Legislating Within a Backdrop
The strongest justification for reading executive orders and statutes in
light of one another is that Congress does not draft laws in a vacuum. 241 In
Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that “[p]art of a fair
reading of statutory text is recognizing that ‘Congress legislates against
the backdrop’ of certain unexpressed presumptions.” 242 The Bond Court
explained this contention by looking to a criminal statute as an example. 243
In a criminal statute, regardless of whether the statute specifies a mens rea,
common law guidance indicates that there is at least some required
culpable mental state. 244 The Court explained that there are some things
that “go without saying.” 245 This idea applies not only to everyday life but
also to the legislative process. 246 Ultimately, the Court in Bond highlighted
the reality that a lack of limitations in the plain text of the statute does not
suggest the absence of implied limitations based on the backdrop in which
Congress drafted the legislation. 247
The Court’s reasoning in Bond stands for the proposition that
Congress does not draft legislation in a vacuum. 248 Further, the statute’s
lack of specific limiting language does not imply that there are no preexisting limitations that Congress considered when drafting the statute in
the first place. 249 In applying this logic, when an AUMF is drafted and
239. Id. at 632.
240. See Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Minn. v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
241. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 313 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
242. Bond v. U.S., 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 409 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., id.
248. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 313 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
249. See, e.g., Bond, 572 U.S. 844.
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passed, Congress is assumed to be aware of pre-existing laws. This should
include executive orders by way of analogy because executive orders are
afforded the force and effect of law. 250 In cases where there are preexisting, self-imposed limitations upon the executive, it is difficult to
suggest that Congress, in drafting legislation, has not taken into
consideration these pre-existing laws and regulations. Just as Congress in
drafting a criminal statute with no expressed mens rea contemplates some
form of mental state based on pre-existing legal norms, so too does
Congress consider pre-existing law and legal norms when drafting
AUMFs. 251 Namely, Congress drafts AUMFs against the backdrop of preexisting statutes and executive orders, which might influence the law
Congress plans to implement. 252
Further, in cases where a pre-existing limitation exists within an
executive order, Congress may not feel the need to restate a limitation it
considered part of the backdrop when it was legislating. In the end, this
would be something that would “go without saying,” to echo the Bond
Court. 253 Had Congress wanted to exclude any pre-existing laws or
provisions from its consideration in drafting legislation, it could have
expressed this intent when drafting. While Congress may choose to draft
AUMFs to explicitly exclude the consideration of some instruments,
where it fails to do so, the general presumption that it legislates within the
backdrop of pre-existing law ought to prevail. 254 In the end, if Congress
was averse to an existing executive order and had intended it not to apply,
it would have explicitly conveyed that intent.
B. A Better Served Legal System: Unity & Alignment
In understanding executive orders as potential, meaningful limitations
on the discretion broadly drafted AUMFs afford the President, the effects
executive orders may have on the structure of the legal system should be
considered. As previously noted, the Framers of the Constitution drew
upon the Montesquiean principles of separation of powers. 255 The
influence of a separation of powers theory was not the Framer’s sole
theoretical approach in drafting the Constitution. 256 While in theory a rigid
separation of powers is attractive, it fails to account for the fact that
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967).
See Bond, 572 U.S. at 857.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., id.
FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 297.
Id.
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government is a unit. 257 As such, government “depends upon the
coordination of all parts to a common end.” 258 It is thus that the Framers
were influenced not only by the French model of separation of powers but
also by the English system of shared powers. 259 The result of these two
influences was the current U.S. system—some powers enumerated for
specific branches of government and others, a shared power between the
branches. 260 While there are three branches each responsible for its
respective sphere, rigid separation is practically impossible. 261 The
branches must coordinate, as government is a unit. 262
As a result of this system of shared powers, it is inevitable that
instances will arise where there is a “zone of twilight” 263 in the division of
powers. 264 Essentially, where powers overlap, there are bound to be gray
areas, which may cause controversy amongst the branches. 265 In instances
such as this, each branch has been “wisely jealous of the encroachments
by any other branch.” 266 Most commonly, the branches at odds with one
another are the legislative and executive branches.267 The Executive has
the duty to carry out the will of Congress in enforcing the laws that
Congress drafts. 268 While the line between Congress and the Executive
remains blurred, what is unmistakable is the overarching desire for unity
amongst the branches so that they might function as one governmental
unit. 269 This desire for unity was most apparent in the spirit of Justice
Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence. 270 Justice Jackson explained that
“[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
257. William Howard Taft, Boundaries between the Executive, the Legislative
and the Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1916).
258. Id.
259. FELDMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 297.
260. Id.
261. Taft, supra note 257, at 600.
262. Id.
263. The “zone of twilight” refers Justice Jackson’s category two case, where
the President acts in an area where Congress is silent. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
264. Taft, supra note 257, at 600.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
270. Id.
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interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.” 271 Ultimately, the value of
alignment and unity amongst the branches is apparent not only from a
political perspective but also from a legal perspective. The desire for unity
is not only theoretical but it also finds a meaningful place in examining
how the nation views the validity of laws. If unity amongst branches is an
overarching goal of the U.S. legal system, then it naturally follows that
compatibility between executive law-making and legislative law-making
ought to be a priority.
Viewing pre-existing, self-imposed limitations on executive orders as
meaningful tools for interpreting the scope of AUMFs furthers the purpose
of reaching unity and alignment between the executive and legislative
branches. The effect of viewing executive orders as meaningful limitations
on AUMFs does not favor one branch over the other. 272 Instead, it
recognizes the important role of each and works to ensure that those goals
are aligned, furthering the Youngstown majority’s goals. 273 Overall, the
legal system would be better served if self-imposed limitations on the
Executive were understood as meaningful for interpreting the scope of
AUMFs because it would promote unity and alignment between the
branches. In contrast, failing to recognize these self-imposed limitations
as such does not further the goals the majority articulated in
Youngstown. 274 Instead, complete disregard for executive orders that have
the force and effect of law 275 frustrates these goals by choosing to
acknowledge one form of law-making over the other. This does not
promote unity but instead welcomes disunity amongst the branches.
IV. AN ILLUSTRATION: LIMITING THE 2001 AUMF WITH EXISTING
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
The theory and solution set forth in this Comment can ultimately be
illustrated in its application to Executive Order No. 12,333; Executive
Order No. 13,732; and the 2001 AUMF. Applying the principle of
harmonization to these provisions clearly exemplifies the way in which
executive orders should act as meaningful restrictions on the President’s
discretion in using force under a broadly drafted AUMF. To best illustrate
this, the history and purpose of each provision must be considered.

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
See generally id.
Id.
Id.
Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967).
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A. 2001 AUMF
As previously discussed, Congress passed Joint Resolution 107-40
authorizing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 . . . .” 276 The goal of passing this joint resolution, now
known as the 2001 AUMF, was to “prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States . . . .” 277 The broad drafting of the 2001
AUMF may subject it to even broader interpretations in practice because
of presidential discretion to interpret what force is “necessary and
appropriate.” 278 The ability to broaden the AUMF through interpretation
is not only true for the 2001 AUMF but also for AUMFs that have been or
will be broadly drafted in the future. To limit the discretion afforded to the
President and determine the scope of the “necessary and appropriate”
language, the AUMF should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent
with executive orders pertaining to the use of force.
B. Executive Order No. 12,333 & the 2001 AUMF
One example of an executive order capable of narrowing the scope of
“necessary and appropriate” is Executive Order No. 12,333’s prohibition
on assassination. 279 Prior to Congress’s issuance of the 2001 AUMF,
President Reagan implemented Executive Order No. 12,333. 280 Executive
Order No. 12,333 is viewed as having had a substantial effect on foreign
policy and national security. 281 The purpose of the order was to hold
agencies of the executive branch accountable for their actions.282 Of
particular relevance is Section 2.11 of Executive Order 12,333, which
contains a prohibition on assassination. 283 This prohibition reads, “No
person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government
276. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. §2,
115 Stat. 225 (2001) (enacted).
277. Id.
278. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981).
279. Id.
280. Taran Molloy, Qassem Soleimani, Targeted Killing of State Actors, and
Executive Order 12,333, 52 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 163, 166 (2021).
281. Newland, supra note 20, at 2030.
282. Marc B. Langston, Rediscovering Congressional Intelligence Oversight:
Is Another Church Committee Possible Without Frank Church?, 2 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 433, 452 (2015).
283. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981).
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shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” 284 While the
working definition of what constitutes an assassination remains
controversial, the clearest definition of assassination is found in W. Hays
Parks’ 1989 memorandum. 285 According to Parks, a peacetime
assassination “encompass[es] the murder of a private individual or public
figure for political purposes . . . .” 286 Though the definition of
assassination 287 contains unique complexities, this Comment adopts the
Parks memorandum definition as the working definition of assassination
during peacetime.288 Considering the previous discussion on the effect of
issuing an executive order, Executive Order No. 12,333’s prohibition on
assassination seems to bar targeted killings against specific individuals
where there is a political purpose for the killing. 289
In attempting to harmonize the 2001 AUMF and Executive Order No.
12,333’s prohibition on assassination, the backdrop in which Congress
drafted and passed the 2001 AUMF should be considered. When Congress
implemented the 2001 AUMF, Executive Order No. 12,333’s prohibition
on assassination had long been a part of the legal backdrop, specifically
regarding the regulation of the internal affairs of the executive branch.290
Various administrations have recognized this order, including the George
W. Bush administration, during which the 2001 AUMF was passed. 291
Therefore, the prohibition on assassination would have been part of the

284. Id.
285. Molloy, supra note 280, at 168.
286. W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and
Assassination, 12 ARMY L. 4, 4 (1989).
287. Assassination is a subset of targeted killing, though one must differentiate
it from the traditional understanding of a targeted killing. While targeted killings
are not generally considered unlawful, assassinations have been deemed unlawful
under International Humanitarian Law. In his memorandum, W. Hays Parks sets
forth two definitions of assassination. Parks creates a dichotomy between how
assassinations should be understood during wartime and during peace. While the
memorandum broadly defines assassination as a murder that targets a specific
individual for political purposes, the circumstances in which the targeting killing
is authorized is determinative of whether the killing will fall within the definition
of assassination and, therefore, be unlawful. See Parks, supra note 286, at 4–5;
see also Molloy, supra note 280, at 166.
288. See Parks, supra note 286, at 4.
289. Id.
290. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981). Executive Order No.
12,333’s prohibition on assassination was issued 20 years prior to the passage of
the 2001 AUMF.
291. Molloy, supra note 280, at 168.

2022]

COMMENT

483

backdrop in which Congress was legislating. 292 It is likely that in drafting
legislation Congress was, or at least should have been, aware of the
existence of this self-imposed limitation on the power of the Executive.
Finding that the executive order was part of the backdrop in which
Congress was legislating, it would be reasonable to read the prohibition on
assassination in light of the 2001 AUMF in attempting to determine the
scope of the AUMF. The result would be as follows: on the one hand, the
2001 AUMF allows the Executive the discretion to use force that he
determines is “necessary and appropriate.” 293 On the other hand,
Executive Order No. 12,333 prohibits an employee or agent of the United
States from engaging or conspiring to engage in assassination.294 Were
these provisions interpreted to be compatible, the prohibition on
assassination would place a limit on the ability of the Executive to
determine what force is “necessary and appropriate” 295 but only to the
extent that the force chosen would not amount to assassination. In the end,
the harmonization would result in a meaningful limitation on a broadly
drafted AUMF. Additionally, it would exemplify the unity amongst
branches that Justice Jackson’s framework in his Youngstown concurrence
sought to endorse. 296
C. 2001 AUMF & Executive Order No. 13,732
Another example of an executive order that limits the presidential
discretion under the 2001 AUMF is Executive Order No. 13,732. 297
Executive Order No. 13,732 articulates the United States Policy on Preand Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S.
Operations Involving the Use of Force. 298 Specifically, § 2(a)(iv) requires
the President “take feasible precautions . . . in conducting attacks to reduce
the likelihood of civilian casualties, such as providing warnings to the
civilian population . . . [and] taking steps to ensure military objectives and

292. See generally Bond v. U.S., 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
293. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. §2,
115 Stat. 225 (2001) (enacted).
294. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981).
295. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. §2,
115 Stat. 225 (2001) (enacted).
296. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–
38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
297. Exec. Order No. 13,732, 81 C.F.R. § 44483 (2016).
298. Id.
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civilians are clearly distinguished . . . .” 299 This language draws upon the
Principle of Distinction.300
The Principle of Distinction in International Humanitarian Law
requires combatants to make reasonable efforts to distinguish between
those participating in armed conflict and civilians. 301 Unlike Executive
Order No. 12,333, Executive Order No. 13,732 did not exist when the
legislature passed the 2001 AUMF. 302 While this calls into question
whether Congress could have legislated with the notion of avoiding
civilian casualties in the backdrop, the idea was present because Executive
Order No. 13,732 is a mere codification of a pre-existing and widely
recognized International Humanitarian Law principle. 303 It is difficult to
suggest that when drafting the 2001 AUMF Congress would have been
blind to the pre-existing legal norms associated with conducting war and
authorizing force in the international arena.
Additionally, the recency of Executive Order No. 13,732 could be
grounds to afford a greater weight to its provisions. This is because it
articulates modern U.S. policies concerning the use of force and gives
instruction as to what is “necessary and appropriate” 304 when using force.
299. Id.
300. The Principle of Distinction is a norm of customary international law that
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) codified. The ICRC is an
organization whose work is based on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their
Additional Protocol. See Mandate and mission, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/mandate [https://perma.cc/T7ZV-L5HG] (last
visited July 26, 2022).
301. The ICRC’s codification of the Principle of Distinction States: “The
parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and
combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not
be directed against civilians.” Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between
Civilians and Combatants, CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, https://ihl-databases
.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule1#refFn_D70F41D7_000
03 [https://perma.cc/B4RR-75AR] (last visited July 26, 2022).
302. Executive Order No. 13,732 was not issued until 15 years after the
passage of the 2001 AUMF. See Exec. Order No. 13,732, 81 C.F.R. § 44483
(2016); see also Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong.
§2, 115 Stat. 225 (2001) (enacted).
303. The Principle of Distinction is a norm of customary international law
applicable to both international and non-international armed conflicts. The
principle dates back to 1868, where it was first set forth in the St. Petersburg
Declaration. See Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and
Combatants, supra note 301.
304. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. §2,
115 Stat. 225 (2001) (enacted).
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If the 2001 AUMF’s “necessary and appropriate” language was read in
light of Executive Order No. 13,732, then the President would have to
distinguish between civilians and military combatants for the use of force
to be “necessary and appropriate.” 305
V. THE WEAKNESSES OF RELYING ON EXECUTIVE ORDERS TO LIMIT
AUMFS
Although understanding an executive order as a meaningful limitation
for interpreting the scope of an AUMF can further the goal of the legal
system to unify the branches, there are still some practical concerns that
are worth noting. One of the most prominent arguments against holding
the President accountable to an executive order arising under the authority
Article II of the Constitution grants is that an executive order does not
create a private right of action in court. 306 In the end, there is no judicial
enforcement mechanism that would hold the President accountable for a
violation of that order. 307 For this reason, plaintiffs can do little to
challenge the actions of the executive branch, or lack thereof, in
accordance with an order. 308 The non-justiciability of executive orders is
premised upon the notion that the President is to “take [c]are that the [l]aws
[are] faithfully executed . . . .” 309 While this is theoretically consistent, it
fails to address what recourse is available when the President chooses not
to enforce or act in accordance with his own orders. This calls into
question whether an executive order has the actual effect of law if it cannot
be enforced. Additionally, the nature of an executive order is such that the
President has the ability to unilaterally issue executive orders and also
unilaterally repeal them if he so desires. 310 He may even repeal the order
and act contrary to it without notifying anyone of the changes to this
order. 311 The fact that the President has the ability at any moment to simply
overturn or modify the executive order at his whim calls into question the
enforceability of an executive order. 312
While executive orders lack a true coercive means of attaining
executive compliance, this does not mean that executive orders are inept
for statutory interpretation. To suggest so is contrary to the courts’
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id.
Newland, supra note 20, at 2075.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
What Is an Executive Order?, supra note 21.
Newland, supra note 20, at 2081.
Id.
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treatment of executive orders as being afforded the force and effect of
law. 313 Executive orders often represent a policy of the Executive, and they
purport to govern the internal affairs of the executive branch.314
Additionally, one of the consequences of a president acting contrary to or
altering an executive order secretly is that “the published Order stays on
the books . . . .” 315 When a published order stays on the books, “it actively
misleads Congress and the public as to what the law is.” 316 While the
presence of the executive order on the books may not grant it any greater
legitimacy, whether Congress is misled directly relates to the notion set
forth in Bond that Congress legislates within a backdrop. 317 Given that
executive orders have the force and effect of law, 318 they too fall within
the backdrop that Congress uses to draft new legislation. In the end, if
Congress is led to believe that an executive order is still in effect, it may
create legislation that accounts for the existence of that executive order.
Thus, even if the President implicitly or explicitly overturns an executive
order, compliance with that executive order may be enforceable through a
law that Congress drafted and passed in light of that preexisting executive
order. Further, repealing an executive order and acting in accordance with
that repeal may serve as an express contradiction to the will of Congress
in passing the statute premised upon the executive order.
Surely, an executive order is not the sturdiest limitation on the power
of the President, since he can, at any moment, relieve himself of the duties
to abide by the order. While not the strongest, the limitation still provides
part of the backdrop for which Congress legislates, and it communicates
to Congress things that ought to be considered in their drafting of
legislation. 319 If this is assumed to be true, then the fact that an executive
order is not the sturdiest limitation should not affect the value of using the
executive order as a means for determining scope. Additionally, the fact
that these limitations are not airtight might be beneficial, particularly
regarding foreign policy. It is worth recognizing that foreign policy
decisions often require some sort of latitude. 320 Since latitude is often
necessary in determinations implicating foreign affairs, a limitation that is
313. Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967);
see also Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Minn. v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
314. What Is an Executive Order?, supra note 21.
315. Newland, supra note 20, at 2081.
316. Id.
317. Bond v. U.S., 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014).
318. Farkas, 375 F.2d at 632 n.1.
319. See generally Bond, 572 U.S. 844.
320. Gaziano, supra note 32, at 275.
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not airtight might be preferred. Essentially, a loose limitation would allow
the President to adapt to unforeseen circumstances when such flexibility
proves necessary for the purpose of effective foreign policy. 321
Of the challenges presented, the greatest hurdle the approach faces is
that it fails to address any method for enforcement. It proposes a better
way to envision what law should be, but on its own it is insufficient to
provide anything more than a theoretical solution to a complex issue of
separation of powers. While law and its perception evolve, it does so
gradually. 322 For this reason, effectuating a change in the way legal
scholars view separation of powers and the role of the executive order will
take more than one student comment proposing a solution steeped in
theory. Suggesting that AUMFs be read in conjunction with pre-existing
executive orders requires that there be some point in time where the
AUMF is actually interpreted. Ultimately, the Office of Legal Counsel
would be the interpreter. 323 Those who advise the President of the
legalities of his choices would be the only parties who could, in practice,
use this theory to interpret the force that the President may use. 324 Even
then, the solution would remain theoretical since there are no guarantees
that the Office of Legal Counsel would attempt to harmonize executive
orders with authorizations of force. In effect, the only parties that could
hold the President accountable would be the lawyers he has appointed
himself—an accountability mechanism that does not bode well for the
limitation of presidential powers.
VI. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Although largely theoretical, this solution can be made concrete if
drafted into future AUMFs. Specifically, Congress should incorporate a
clause in future AUMFs that requires the President to consult current
legislation, executive orders, and other instruments given the force and
effect of law when making determinations about the use of force. Further,
the President should only make determinations that are consistent with all
321. See U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). The
Court recognized the functional necessity of a relaxed judiciary with respect to
foreign affairs. The Court emphasized the notion that the President ought be
afforded more flexibility or discretion in foreign affairs since the President “has
the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially . . . in time of war.” Id.
322. See Randall T. Shepard, The Importance of Legal History for Modern
Lawyering, 30 IND. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997).
323. Id.
324. Id.
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existing legal instruments. 325 As articulated by the Supreme Court in Bond,
Congress legislates within a backdrop that includes other legislation and
executive orders. 326 While it would be impractical for Congress to express
every provision it considered in drafting, it can include a methodology for
presidential determinations that requires the President to look to the
overall backdrop of the law in making decisions about the force that is
“necessary and appropriate” under AUMFs. 327
Following the passage of the War Powers Resolution, all AUMFs have
shared a similar statutory construction. 328 Generally, an AUMF contains
between two and four sections. 329 Common to all AUMFs is a section
containing the actual language authorizing the President to use military
force. 330 This section is the particular part of the joint resolution that
Congress drafted broadly, affording the President a vast amount of
discretion. 331 In addition to the authorization section of the AUMF, there
is often a section entitled “Presidential Determination.” 332 The Presidential
Determination section contains instruction on presidential determinations
to use force. 333 These requirements call on the President to use diplomatic
and peaceful means prior to using force and show that those peaceful
means were insufficient to resolve the issue. 334
Since 1991, the determination requirements of an AUMF, if present at
all, only require that the President first exhaust all peaceful diplomatic
resources. 335 This section, when present, does not give the President any
guidance or methodology for making the determination regarding when
325. Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967).
326. See generally Bond v. U.S., 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
327. Id.
328. Following the passage of the War Powers Resolution, AUMFs have been
structured into sections. The sections generally include: (1) a short title; (2)
language authorizing the president to use force; (3) requirements for presidential
determinations to use force; (4) applicability of the War Powers Resolution; and
(5) requirements for reporting uses of force to Congress. See generally
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 77,
102d Cong., Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991); Authorization for Use of
Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. §2, 115 Stat. 225 (2001) (enacted);
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J.
Res. 114, 107th Cong., 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
329. See generally 105 Stat. 3; 115 Stat. 225; 116 Stat. 1498.
330. See generally 105 Stat. 3; 115 Stat. 225; 116 Stat. 1498.
331. See generally 105 Stat. 3; 115 Stat. 225; 116 Stat. 1498.
332. See generally 105 Stat. 3; 115 Stat. 225; 116 Stat. 1498.
333. See generally 105 Stat. 3; 115 Stat. 225; 116 Stat. 1498.
334. See generally 105 Stat. 3; 115 Stat. 225; 116 Stat. 1498.
335. See generally 105 Stat. 3; 115 Stat. 225; 116 Stat. 1498.
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force ought be used and what force is appropriate. 336 Even in AUMFs
where there is a specific requirement for the President to report to
Congress, these reports do not effectively limit the discretion the President
has in making his initial determination of force. 337
To ensure that the President considers all instruments of law, including
executive orders, to determine the appropriate use of force in accordance
with an AUMF, Congress should add language to future AUMFs under
the “Presidential Determination” section requiring the President to make
force determinations in light of other instruments of law. The language
included in the “Presidential Determination” section of future AUMFs
should read as follows:
SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES AUTHORIZATION
REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF
MILITARY FORCE IS NECESSARY
Before exercising the authority granted in subsection (a), the
President shall—
Consider all instruments afforded the force and effect of law
including but not limited to congressional statutes, executive
orders, and treaties; and
Exercise the authority granted in subsection (a) in a manner
compatible with and not contradictory to the instruments afforded
the force and effect of law in subsection (b)(1) of this provision.
The addition of this language makes the requirements for making force
determinations explicit. While the language limits the discretion of the
President in making force determinations to some extent, it only limits him
to the extent that he is required to submit determinations of force that are
not contrary to existing laws, international humanitarian principles, or
existing executive branch policies. The President is tasked with faithfully
executing the laws.338 Therefore, requiring him to make a good faith
determination of force in accordance with existing instruments of law is
consistent with his role as executor of the law. 339 Additionally, this
language would facilitate an understanding of executive orders as
meaningful limitations on AUMFs where judicial and legislative
impediments have failed to do so.

336.
337.
338.
339.

See generally 105 Stat. 3; 115 Stat. 225; 116 Stat. 1498.
See generally 105 Stat. 3; 115 Stat. 225; 116 Stat. 1498.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
See id. art. II, § 1.

490

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Even with a provision of this nature, there are concerns regarding the
President’s capability to not only unilaterally repeal executive orders but
also to act contrary to an executive order without informing the public
about such contrary action. 340 Theoretically, this would allow the
President to consider the limiting executive order in light of the force he
wishes to use, discard the executive order if he is displeased with the way
it would affect his desired use of force, and then proceed to use force that
would be contrary to that executive order. 341 While this seems to weaken
the limiting mechanism presented, the nature of an executive order cannot
be denied. The President, in having the ability to issue executive orders
unilaterally, may also repeal them unilaterally. The nature of an executive
order in this respect is an integral part in the President having the flexibility
required to act in times of emergency or when national security is
implicated.
The value in presenting legislation of this nature is that it strikes the
balance between meaningfully limiting the President without tying his
hands in a way that dilutes the efficiency of his position. The proposed
solution requires the President consider existing instruments of law,
including executive orders, and use force that is consistent with them. This
forces the President to consider current executive orders in making his
force determination. If the President wishes to use force in a way that
contradicts an executive order, he must then repeal and act contrary to it.
Even if the President chooses to act contrary to a limiting executive order,
the statutory language still requires he stop and consider the force he
wishes to use and whether it comports with current United States law and
policy. He then must determine if his desired use of force warrants altering
that law and policy. Ultimately, he is still afforded the authority to alter
that law or policy, allowing him to remain flexible in times of national
emergency where efficiency and flexibility may require a change in law
or policy. The key is that, in making that determination, the President still
has to stop, ponder, and weigh the use of force against the various legal
instruments and foreign affairs policies of the United States. Even where
the President chooses to disregard existing executive orders, requiring that
they be considered slows the process and requires the President to consider
the legal backdrop in which he uses force. 342 Even here, the requirement
of stopping and thinking about the implications of actions can create a
small yet meaningful limitation. Therefore, even where this legislative
solution is rendered its weakest, it still creates a meaningful limitation on
340. Newland, supra note 20, at 2081.
341. Id.
342. See generally Bond v. U.S., 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
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presidential power—one that respects the need for flexibility while
promoting unity amongst the branches 343 and the legal backdrop in which
Congress drafts legislation. 344
CONCLUSION
The legal system values the alignment of the executive and legislative
branches. The Supreme Court has expressed desire for unity amongst the
branches in cases like Youngstown where there is a direct correlation
between executive and legislative alignment and the legality the Supreme
Court affords presidential actions. 345 This desire for alignment amongst
the branches is achieved through the harmonization of executive orders
and authorizations of force by ensuring that executive law-making and
legislative law-making are unified. Further, this approach is consistent
with the notion that Congress legislates within a backdrop of other preexisting laws and regulations. 346 For this reason, the legal system would
be better served if self-imposed limitations on the Executive were
understood to serve as meaningful limitations on the scope of the
President’s ability to interpret broadly drafted AUMFs. Executive orders
have the force and effect of law 347 and have been treated as equal in stature
to congressional statutes. 348 This makes it doctrinally appropriate to apply
statutory canons of interpretation in an attempt to harmonize executive
orders and AUMFs for the purpose of determining the scope of the
authorization.
Further, the harmony between executive orders and AUMFs should be
facilitated through the implementation of a provision in all future AUMFs
that requires the President to consider all existing legal instruments,
including executive orders, when determining what force is appropriate.
This ensures that the discretion of the President in interpreting broadly
drafted AUMFs will be limited to uses of force consistent and not
contradictory to the legal backdrop and current policies of the United
States with respect to foreign affairs. 349
343. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
344. See generally Bond, 572 U.S. 844.
345. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579.
346. See generally Bond, 572 U.S. 844.
347. Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967).
348. See Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Minn. v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
349. See generally Bond, 572 U.S. 844.
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Despite the limitations and questions that remain, AUMFs should be
viewed in light of self-imposed limitations on the Executive for the
purposes of limiting the scope of broad drafting. To ensure self-imposed
limitations are meaningful restraints on executive discretion, future
AUMFs should include a provision that requires the President to consider
all existing instruments of law and use force in a way that is compatible
with and not contradictory to those instruments. This provision will
facilitate the use of executive orders as meaningful restraints on
presidential power, creating the greatest juxtaposition—a limitation of the
power of the President with his own power. Historically, executive orders
have not been the first tool in the judicial toolbox for interpreting statutory
law, but using these self-imposed limitations on the Executive is the
solution to placing meaningful limitations on AUMFs once Congress has
drafted them.

